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1‘Cometh the hour, cometh the Dave’: how far is the Conservative 
Party’s revival all down to David Cameron?
Tim Bale, University of Sussex
The secret  of politics, like the secret of comedy, is timing, which may  be why the two 
pursuits often seem to have so much in common.  Gordon Brown – after an 
uncomfortable spell as Mr Bean – is certainly laughing more these days and even 
hoping for a happy  ending.  But while his confident  handling of the global credit 
crunch stands an outside chance of saving his government’s bacon, the likelihood is 
that the recession will make it harder rather than easier for Labour to hang on to 
power in a year or so – by  which time the economy may be beginning to recover 
sufficiently to afford the Tories (assuming they  can avoid massive tax increases and/or 
spending cuts) a second victory on the trot, say  in 2014.  When accounting for a 
potential Conservative win in 2009 or 2010, however, we are dealing with more than 
just another case of ‘The economy, stupid’.  A Tory  victory, after all, began to look 
possible within days of David Cameron assuming the leadership  – long before things 
turned truly  pear-shaped on the financial front.1  Given his Party had been ‘flatlining’ 
for around a decade, such a rapid turnaround requires some explanation.
Clearly not all the reasons behind that turnaround have to do with Cameron himself. 
The challenges presented to him by both the external environment and the state of his 
own party provide a sharp contrast to those faced by his three predecessors as leader 
of the opposition, let alone by the last  Tory premier, John Major.  Moreover, it is easy 
to overdo the pace, nature and scope of change achieved by Cameron in such a short 
space of time: survey research, for example, suggests that the public is less hostile to 
but still ambivalent about the Tories; meanwhile, one can argue that they  have not so 
much dumped their ideology overboard as tempered and complemented it.2   For all 
this, however, it  is undeniable that the fortunes of the Conservative Party  have revived 
under Cameron’s leadership  in a way that they  patently  failed to do under his 
predecessors, none of whom have had anything like his success in doing the things 
that Tory oppositions have traditionally (and very  successfully) done to put 
themselves back in contention.3  Nor would it be fair to say that he is simply a lucky 
general, riding the wave of historical inevitability.  After all, many find themselves in 
the right place at the right time, but still fail to do the right things.  ‘Cometh the hour, 
cometh the man’ – or in this case, as political columnist Matthew Parris put it just 
after Cameron was chosen as leader, ‘the Dave’.4
The hour: why Cameron has it easier than his predecessors.
David Cameron is clearly operating in what – for an opposition party at least – is a 
more benign external environment than his predecessors.  The Labour government 
faced by William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard had its fair share of 
problems.  But, until the invasion of Iraq fatally undermined confidence in Tony Blair, 
it was barely troubled by the main opposition.  Not only was it led by one of the most 
gifted party  leaders this country has ever seen, it had inherited and successfully 
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allowed it to realise, albeit imperfectly, Blair’s central claim, namely  that there need 
be no trade off between economic efficiency  and social justice.  Relying not simply on 
borrowing but  on buoyant tax receipts, Gordon Brown was able to deliver 
unprecedented increases in spending on health and education.  Moreover, helped by 
both the electorate’s innate sense that  you can’t get something for nothing and the 
Conservative’s underinvestment in public services in the 1980s and 1990s, the Blair 
government was able to persuade voters that even the most marginal of tax cuts would 
automatically lead to the closure of schools and hospitals.   Meanwhile, though rarely 
able to overturn the Tories’ ownership  of issues like crime, immigration and defence, 
New Labour proved itself sufficiently concerned about them to prevent them 
becoming electorally  damaging – a move which also tempted the Conservatives to 
adopt populist positions that, while they struck a chord with Labour voters, failed to 
prompt them to defect and managed to alienate some of the Tories’ educated, middle-
class support.
Cameron, by contrast, started his time as leader of the opposition facing a Prime 
Minister who was evidently  nearing, or was even past, his sell-by date.  He was also 
aided by  the widely predicted failure of Blair’s successor – once his initial bounce 
was cancelled out by the incredible run of ill-fortune that  followed his bottling of an 
early election – to connect with the British public.  Moreover, that public (or sections 
of it) was at last beginning to chafe against the more or less stealthy rises in taxation 
that had been used to pay  for improvements in public services that were either banked 
without much gratitude or regarded with some scepticism given their apparent failure 
to match the money  spent.  More recently, of course, Labour’s luck on the economy 
has run out, too.  The feelgood factor has long since disappeared, while all the 
indicators suggest that Brown’s implicit claim to have abolished boom and bust was 
little more than a hollow boast.  After occupying Downing Street for more than eleven 
years, the government may try  to claim that its handling of the recession will be more 
effective and more humane than the Tories’ efforts at the beginning of the eighties and 
nineties.  But it can no longer suggest – as it did for so long – that any problems either 
in the public or the private sector are the fault of the last Conservative government. 
‘Voters’, as eminent American political scientist V.O. Key once put it, ‘are not fools.’
David Cameron also leads a party which, irrespective of his own efforts, is both more 
malleable and more manageable than the one which confronted (sometimes in the 
literal sense of the word!) his predecessors.5  There are many reasons for this.  One is 
simply  that the people and the issues that made it  so hard for them – even if they 
didn’t exactly help themselves – have moved on.  One does not need to buy into the 
cod-psychology  that puts the Party’s troubles down to the matricide of Margaret 
Thatcher in November 1990, to realise that the medical force majeure that has seen 
her transformed over time from a constantly  carping critic into a venerable historical 
figure has provided its own resolution.  Likewise, the parliamentary party Cameron 
leads is not the same one that witnessed her glory days, or her going, at  first hand. 
Indeed, over half of Tory MPs elected in 2005 won their seats after 1997.6  The exit 
from the Commons, either by death or retirement, of the old and the bold who 
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the poison.  The heat, too, has (though not necessarily for ever) gone out of the issue 
that became their casus belli.  The realisation that this country is unlikely to adopt the 
euro and the obstacles faced by the Lisbon Treaty has put the issue where it has been 
for most of the electorate if not most of the Conservative Party, namely way  down the 
list of priorities.  Equally importantly, the determination of Hague and then Duncan 
Smith to ensure the triumph of Euroscepticism, combined with the decision by 
Duncan Smith and then Howard not to make too much of that triumph, calmed things 
down considerably.
The new intakes of 2001 and 2005, and to a lesser extent 1997, are not necessarily 
less right-wing than the men (and handful of women) they replaced, but they  regard 
Euroscepticism as a given rather than a touchstone, and they admire Thatcher without 
worshipping her.  They – and some of the younger members of the still shrinking 
party  in the country – are also more comfortable with the UK as it  is rather than how 
it used to be.  Political correctness may still be frowned upon, especially of course 
when ‘gone mad’.  But it  no longer encompasses the defence of words or deeds that 
are explicitly or even implicitly discriminatory towards women and ethnic minorities. 
By the same token, while they would of course deprecate the idea that a party  should 
form its policies on the basis of survey research or focus groups, fewer and fewer 
believe that the saloon bar of the Dog and Duck, or for that matter the pages of the 
Daily Mail, are a far better way of finding out what voters really  think.  That in itself 
is a marked contrast with the attitudes of many of those that the Party’s pollsters and 
Central Office strategists had to cope with for years after Labour’s landslide.  Also in 
marked contrast  to the party bequeathed by John Major to his successors is the 
comparative lack of hard and fast factions.  Meanwhile, as the Party  has ticked off the 
years between 1997 and 2009, exhaustion has given way first to frustration and finally 
to hunger.  Many of those most recently elected have seen the men and women they 
worked for as researchers and volunteers spend the best years of their political lives in 
opposition and they have no intention of doing the same themselves.
It may be banal, even trite, to say, as many  Tories do say, that those were years that 
their party simply  had to get through.  But there is nevertheless some truth in the idea. 
For an institution ideologically  convinced that it had a monopoly on wisdom and that 
its main opponent was essentially  a pale imitation guaranteed to let down the 
electorate, it was always going to take more than one big defeat to see it even start to 
come to its senses.  This was especially the case when the print media that plays such 
a big part – some would say too big a part – in the counsels of the Party  called not for 
moderation (as did the papers loyal to Labour in the 1980s and early 1990s) but for 
more of the same.  Here, too, there has been some change.  It would be an 
exaggeration to say that the right-wing press is wholly  convinced by the Cameron 
project: the Daily Mail is still edited by Paul Dacre, hardly  a mincing metrosexual, 
while the Telegraph titles still have their doubts.  But both recognise that Cameron is 
the only game in town, now and in the foreseeable future.  The speculation that 
Hague, and in particular Duncan Smith, had to put up within months or even days of 
winning the leadership is notable by its absence in any of the papers.  The Express is 
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to follow their readers, which on current form suggests relatively favourable 
coverage: it is hard to imagine, for example, the Sun these days going with a front 
page comprising David Cameron’s head superimposed on a dead parrot – an indignity 
William Hague had to suffer after barely a year in post.
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those who went before him
Given the interference and intriguing of the press during Tory  leadership contests 
since John Major urged his rivals to put up or shut up in 1995, it is tempting to 
suggest that those looking for evidence of the media’s impact on politics might be 
better advised to look at those relatively small-scale elections than the large-scale 
national affairs they normally focus on.  But the fact  is that, even without the 
newspapers telling them who to vote for after 1997, Conservatives would have been 
prevented by their own prejudices (either on Europe or on matters sexual) from 
electing the leaders who might have accelerated what has become known as 
modernisation.  Instead they chose men who, in their own ways, were manifestly not 
up to doing what needed to be done, namely to make straight for the centre-ground 
and stay there come what may, all the while attempting to show that the Party bore at 
least a passing resemblance to a twenty-first century Britain it actually liked rather 
than deplored.
For all the affection and esteem in which he is now held by his Party, William Hague 
was never taken seriously by the electorate after early PR gaffes.7  Perhaps due to his 
inexperience, his judgement was also questionable, particularly, say  many Tories, 
when it came to his choice of advisors.  Some – understandably  given their boss’s 
lamentable, even laughable, image – were more concerned with protecting his own 
position rather than promoting the interests of the Party.  At very least, they were in 
danger of conflating the two things.  Others were simply  wedded – or believed there 
was no realistic alternative – to avoiding a fight with Labour on the bread and butter 
issues that really  mattered, particularly  health and education.  Better they insisted, 
against the advice of their own pollsters, to focus on the kind of tub-thumping and 
headline-chasing which, they argued, would not only mobilise their own supporters 
but also woo some of Labour’s more narrow-minded and self-interested voters into 
the Conservative camp.8   Stung by  the internal reaction to a speech by his deputy 
which hinted at a move back to the centre ground, and believing that the scepticism 
which helped the Party win the European Parliament elections in 1999 could pay 
dividends in a national contest, Hague sank back into his own, essentially  Thatcherite, 
comfort zone.9
Iain Duncan Smith, it  was cruelly claimed, was William Hague without the brains or, 
for that matter, the witty repartee.  Hopeless in the Commons and on TV and radio, he 
too was unable, under the pressure of opinion polls that refused to shift, of a right-
wing press that continually called not for moderation but for more red-meat, and of 
his own Thatcherite instincts, to stick to what passed for a political strategy. To say 
that the 777 days that he served as Conservative Party  leader were a complete waste 
of time would be too harsh.  Like Michael Foot, he might, ironically, have done the 
Party some good by supposedly  being so bad.  More positively, Duncan Smith did 
begin to point the way, albeit fitfully, towards a concern for those left behind or 
untouched by prosperity that would bear fruit or at least  some resemblance to what 
was to come.  Ultimately, however, he presided over a party that risked descending 
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most talented individuals, that  eventually lost the confidence of the economic interests 
which funded it, and whose ideas were still some way away from the preferences of 
the electorate whose votes it needed to return to power.
In so doing, IDS all but obliged the Party to turn to a politician who was no more 
likely to help  it achieve that last  aim – at least  in the short-term – than he was himself. 
Michael Howard may well have saved Conservative MPs from themselves by 
providing the grip  and the gravitas needed to produce the self-discipline they so sorely 
lacked under Duncan Smith.  He may  even, very briefly, in what to all intents and 
purposes was his first big speech as leader (at London’s Saatchi Gallery) have 
provided a ray  of hope to those within his own ranks who believed that salvation lay 
in the centre ground.  But, no less of a Thatcherite than his predecessors, and even 
less enamoured than they were of ‘the vision thing’ he, like them, quickly returned to 
what since 1997 had become the Conservatives’ comfort zone.  He, too, seemed 
prepared to concede that Labour could not be beaten unless its spending plans for 
schools and hospitals were matched.  But he likewise insisted that  this need not rule 
out tax cuts and ensured that it would anyway be drowned out by  promises to crack 
down on crime, immigration and even gypsies.  The result was woeful.  True, the 
Tories picked up extra seats in 2005 whereas in 2001 they had virtually stood still. 
But they still won less than Labour had done at its own low point in 1983 
notwithstanding the fact that Blair had become a liability  rather than an asset and 
confidence in the government as a whole was rapidly draining away.
Yet Howard can justly claim to have done David Cameron, and therefore his party, a 
favour or two.  For one thing, he effectively  tested to destruction the claim that if only 
the Conservatives shouted louder rather than really listened to the electorate they 
would persuade it to listen.  If the options open to political parties eventually come 
down to a choice between ‘preference shaping’ (the heroic assumption that you can 
get voters to see things your way) and ‘preference accommodation’ (the assumption 
that you need to adjust to what they think), then the Tories’ result in 2005 may have 
encouraged more of them finally to consider giving the second option a go – 
especially  after Howard organised a series of forums for his post-election 
parliamentary  party  where they  were treated to presentations on how poorly the Party 
was perceived by the public.  For another, Howard, despite putting up  with 
considerable flak (now forgotten) for doing so, managed to delay a leadership contest 
in which Cameron emerged not only as head-and-shoulders above his rivals in terms 
of presentational skills but with a mandate – and just as importantly a fully-formed 
plan – to change his party.
The man (and the strategy): what’s so different about David Cameron?
As Malcolm Gladwell’s recent bestseller, Outliers, reminds us, success in almost any 
field relies powerfully on legacy, opportunity, and cultural milieu.  But this does not 
mean we can completely  discount innate ability  and individual commitment.10  The 
time lag between the Tories losing the election and electing their new leader in 2005 
7meant that, instead of spending much of his leadership, like Hague and Duncan Smith, 
searching for a strategy, Cameron could start straight away to implement one.  Just as 
importantly, however, it was a strategy to which Cameron (along with those in his 
inner circle like Steve Hilton, George Osborne, Michael Gove, Kate Fall, Ed 
Llewellyn and Ed Vaizey) was not only intellectually but also emotionally  committed. 
This could not have been said about his predecessors or the people they preferred to 
have around them, few of whom (as even Team Cameron’s detractors grudgingly 
admit) could claim to be as bright, or as well-blooded in both the Tory media and the 
Tory Party, as they so obviously were.  This, plus the fact that the so-called ‘Notting 
Hill Set’ were personal friends with a common project, rather than simply an 
entourage thrown together by adversity, suggested – even to those who were opposed 
to them – that they were much less likely to abandon the strategy under pressure.   
The bare bones of that  strategy will be familiar to many.  Based on the idea that the 
Conservative ‘brand’ was badly ‘contaminated’, Cameron would begin by  doing 
everything in his power to communicate to the electorate that the Party  was changing 
and, every bit as importantly, was moving back into the centre ground, the alternative 
to which was, he claimed, was ‘irrelevance, defeat and failure.’11   Media silence 
would be maintained on the issues that the Party  had been ‘banging on’ about for far 
too long – not just Europe, which Duncan Smith and Howard had also played down, 
but also the other parts of the so-called ‘Tebbit trinity’, immigration and tax.  The 
vacuum created would be filled by Cameron talking about (and creating striking 
visual images around) issues not normally associated with the Tories, notably the 
environment, as well as international development, corrosive consumerism, and work-
life balance.  Meanwhile, Cameron would challenge Labour’s automatic ownership of 
the NHS and state schooling by  stressing his own family’s reliance on them – and the 
government’s internal divisions on health and education policy – to persuade voters 
that the Conservatives cared about the many rather than (as appeared to be the case 
under his predecessors) the few who could be helped to opt-out.  Public sector 
professionals, many of whom worked in those sectors, would also be wooed by 
assurances that they  were valued and that their professional discretion, eroded by 
Labour’s ‘target  culture’ would be restored by  a Conservative government.  At the 
same time, the leadership would change the system for selecting parliamentary 
candidates in order to make it more likely  that the Party  would put up more women 
and ethnic minority candidates.  Finally, the leadership would implicitly distance itself 
from the Thatcher years not by apologising for them but by stressing, in effect, that 
was then but this is now.
The aim of all this was, firstly, to convince the electorate (and particularly the middle 
classes that historically have been the Conservatives’ real ‘core vote’) that the Tories 
were a pragmatic and moderate alternative to Labour, and secondly to obtain them 
‘permission to be heard.’  Once voters could be persuaded not to automatically 
discount Conservative ideas because they  emanated from a party that was ‘nasty’, 
selfish, old-fashioned, and incompetent, it could begin to play  as well to its traditional 
strengths on, say, crime (and possibly  even immigration and Europe).  Cameron, in 
short, believed in what was coming to be called the ‘and theory’ of Conservatism, 
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possible for the Party to believe in tight controls on immigration and enlightened 
attitudes to minorities, to campaign for a greener environment at the same time as 
reducing the regulatory burden on business, to advocate increased spending on public 
services at the same time as boosting the role of the voluntary sector in provision. 
This would become evident when the Party eventually  got round to pumping out 
policy based in part on the recommendation of groups and task forces set up by 
Cameron on becoming leader.  These allowed him to signal straight away that  the 
Party was doing some fresh thinking and that it  was seeking to reconnect with 
professional and other pressure groups it had long ignored.  It also allowed him to link 
the Party with counter-intuitive ‘brand signifiers’ like Bob Geldof and to tie some 
older Tory statesmen into the modernisation project  at the same time.  Most 
importantly of all perhaps, it helped Cameron hold off the inevitable demand by 
government spokesmen that he rush into producing policies which Labour could then 
either steal or rip to shreds.
Cameron anticipated some resistance from within, particularly from the right, but 
(unlike some of his lieutenants it must be said) preferred to think he could take his 
party  with him without engineering some direct confrontation or a so-called ‘Clause 
IV Moment.’  He was helped of course by the fact that, as he had hoped, his potential 
critics were initially as blown away  as everyone else by the frenetic pace that 
characterised his first  hundred days at the helm.  But Cameron’s task was made much, 
much easier than that of his predecessors by the extended honeymoon the media 
afforded a Conservative leader determined to personify, embody and even be the 
change he was trying to effect – a presidential politician happy to provide them with 
arresting and intimate visuals and to talk about (and show them) his family  life, 
including, of course, his disabled son.  In sharp contrast to his predecessors who were 
either unwilling or unable to come up  with the goods in this respect, here was a 
politician who was recognisably a human being despite his relatively privileged 
background.  Perhaps the sharpest contrast, however, was provided by the opinion 
polls which, at best, had barely budged when Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard had 
taken over.  Simply by taking over the leadership just as the Labour government was 
consumed by internal division and policy arguments, Cameron achieved a step-
change in his Party’s rating, taking it  into the most sustained lead it had enjoyed since 
before Black Wednesday in 1992.  This ensured that  donations came rolling in in 
much greater amounts and much earlier on in the political cycle than at any time since 
the 1980s.  And, especially as local election results have tended to confirm the opinion 
polls, it has made it  much harder for critics either at Westminster or in the media to 
moan that whatever he was doing was not only wrong but not working.
Just as crucially, however, Cameron was able to minimise noises off from the right by 
signalling that, although George Osborne would not be providing them with the up-
front tax cuts and spending restraint craved by  the economic liberals, he was 
personally committed to key aspects of the social agenda favoured by the ‘High 
Tories’.  Reports produced by a re-animated (and suddenly much more impressive) 
Iain Duncan Smith on Britain’s apparently  ‘broken society’ – reports which focused 
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welcome.  And both Cameron and Osborne hinted that they would back their oft-
professed commitment to ‘the family’ by supporting marriage via the tax and benefits 
systems – a move that  many modernisers were uneasy  about and one that  it  would be 
difficult to imagine, say, Michael Portillo (often seen as a prototypical Cameroon) 
making had he made it to the top of the Party in 2001.  Cameron also made much, 
early on, of his belief in ‘social responsibility’ and of the mantra (another borrowing 
from the ‘faith, flag and family’ strain on the right) that ‘There is such a thing as 
society, it’s just not the same as the state’ – a formula that had the additional benefit of 
appearing to distance the Party from Margaret Thatcher at the same time as finding 
favour with those of her disciples who believed government was more often the 
problem than the solution.  The goodwill thus created overrode not only his failure to 
deliver immediately  on his promise to pull Conservative MEPs out of their alliance 
with the European People’s Party (EPP), but also his insistence on respecting the 
rights of, and according due respect to, women, homosexuals and ethnic minorities. 
And as long as right-wingers can accept all that in public (even if they privately 
regard it as politically correct nonsense), Cameron has been happy to bring them onto 
the frontbench – a ‘big tent’ approach that has also helped keep them on board.
Determined that he should lead a party that could retain its principles yet shed any 
hint of prejudice, one that could appeal to traditionalists and yet pass the ‘dinner party 
test’ with the socially-liberal but relatively well-off AB voters the Tories had to win 
back to the fold, Cameron made it  clear he would stamp down hard and swiftly on 
anyone who gave even the appearance of racism.  Compare the speed with which 
Homeland Security  spokesman, Patrick Mercer, was summarily dismissed with some 
of the to-ing and fro-ing that went on when similarly offensive remarks were made by 
Tory MPs under previous leaders.  This move (along with Cameron’s rapid removal of 
the whip  from Derek Conway, his willingness to demote colleagues like Francis 
Maude and David Willetts, who have got him into trouble with the party in the 
country, and his decision to pass responsibility for the Party’s media operation from 
an old chum, George Eustice, to the ex-tabloid editor, Andy Coulson) suggests to 
many Tories that their leader’s judgement and ruthlessness more than makes up for his 
lack of experience.  Likewise, Cameron’s impressive performances in the Commons 
removed from the outset any doubts that  he would be able to hold his own against 
Blair and Brown – a necessary (if not a sufficient) condition of leadership in one of 
the world’s most adversarial systems.  Hague and Howard, though not Duncan Smith, 
were also able to cope in this respect.  Where Cameron beats all of them hands-down, 
however, is in his wider ‘message discipline.’  Perhaps because he was a PR 
professional, Cameron knows he (and his lieutenants) have to repeat the same sound-
bites again and again (and again) over months and even years before they ‘cut-
through’ to the average voter.
That said, Cameron has proved that he can adjust things when necessary.  As it 
became obvious that Brown was seriously considering a general election in the 
autumn of 2007, the Tory  leader brought forward the rebalancing that his team had 
always planned, calculating (correctly it turned out) that the public was now ready to 
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hear some tougher talk on crime and a signature (but supposedly fully-funded) cut in 
inheritance tax.  Because, however, he knew where he was going, once the emergency 
had passed, he soon got back onto more ‘progressive territory’.  Unlike his 
predecessors, then, Cameron does not so much lurch as calibrate. And, while he has a 
reverse gear (as he showed when he ran into an unplanned spot of bother over the 
totemic issue of grammar schools in early 2007), he uses it not to effect a three-point 
turn, but simply to back up  a little in order to drive around the obstacle he is facing – 
something he can do because, unlike his predecessors, he not only knows where he 
wants to go but has a good idea of how he intends to get there.  This also means that 
he has no need to consult, as they did, the maps foisted on him by  the Party’s 
supposed friends in the print  media.  While he evidently  tries very  hard to keep them 
on board – spending time en famille with editors is not uncommon – it is clear that, if 
necessary, he will stop, let them out and continue on his way  without them if he has 
to.  And although Cameron tries to run a relatively  collegial Shadow Cabinet, and to 
ensure that he avoids the charge of inaccessibility levelled at his predecessors, MPs 
with any  ambition to serve in government are also well aware that the same conditions 
of passage apply to them.
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Not all plain sailing from here on in
But if Cameron really is ‘the full package’, he is by no universally acclaimed within 
his own party.  Nor, having caught  the wind after October 2007, is he guaranteed a 
smooth run into Downing Street.  Generational replacement, a highly effective 
Whips’ Office, and of course those opinion poll leads and local election results, mean 
he faces little open criticism.  However, there is still some low-level grumbling from 
the right, especially those whose economic liberalism (and enthusiasm for tax cuts) is 
not outweighed by their commitment to ‘the family’ or ‘mending the broken society’. 
The grammar schools row of spring 2007, the flak Cameron attracted after the 
embarrassing by-election defeat in Ealing Southall, and the criticism he came in for 
when he visited Rwanda instead of staying in flood-hit Britain, were reminders that  he 
cannot take anything for granted.  On the other hand, even his severest critics were 
impressed with his coolness under fire in the run up to and during the course of the 
crucial Conservative Party Conference in the autumn of 2007.  Inasmuch as 
reservations are still expressed, they  are directed mainly  at that Conference’s other 
hero, the Shadow Chancellor George Osborne.  Gratitude is a very perishable 
commodity  in politics and, especially after ‘yachtgate’, there are those, on all sides of 
the Party, who now wonder whether Cameron’s personal loyalty to Osborne (never a 
particularly popular figure with some older MPs) may  mean that the Party is doing 
less well than it otherwise might be against Darling and Brown.
Such concerns reflect a wider worry about the impact of the economic downturn on 
the Conservatives’ strategy and electoral chances.  Cameron’s excellent presentation 
skills made it inevitable he would be accused of being ‘all spin and no substance’ 
even before he became leader.  And his wealthy background has always led some to 
wonder whether he could convincingly  claim to understand the needs of ordinary 
people.  Given that  those selfsame people will be looking for a heavyweight politician 
to protect and deliver them from a deep recession this may be a big disadvantage. 
More generally, Cameron’s strategy was, at least in part, constructed around a 
narrative in which the country’s economic problems had supposedly  been solved in 
the 1980s and 1990s by  a Conservative Party now dedicated instead to sorting out its 
social malaise and putting it on the path to environmental sustainability.  Much of that 
story no longer seems relevant and Cameron now needs to move fast to come up  with 
a new narrative.  So far, he has struggled to do so, and the ongoing search to define a 
resonant response to the crisis has undermined the message discipline that hitherto 
was one of his greatest strengths.
The decision from December 2008 onwards to contrast Tory savings and sound 
finance with Labour’s ‘debt crisis’ has helped in this respect.  But it is a risky one. 
After all, the Party  needs the support of millions of people who have less than fond 
memories of the Conservatives’ largely laissez-faire response to the recessions of the 
early 1980s and 1990s – hence Cameron’s concern to prevent his team using rhetoric 
that reminds voters of the ‘if it’s not hurting, it’s not working’ mantras of the Major 
years.  The decision not to rush into reversing Labour’s plan to up the top-rate of 
taxation was probably a wise one.  So too was suggesting more help for hard-pressed 
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pensioners and those with a little put away in the building society.  It  is unlikely, 
however, that politely criticising banks and City  traders will change the potentially 
damaging public perception that the Tories are still, underneath, the political wing of 
big business rather than a party  that looks out for ordinary people.  It would be a big 
gamble for the Conservatives to go into an election giving the impression that they 
are, as Labour has dubbed them, the ‘do-nothing party’ – apparently committed, once 
again, to what Brown and his colleagues will insist  on calling cuts.  The Tories will of 
course argue that this is inaccurate: they are, after all, only aiming for a slow-down in 
the rate of growth.  But in the light of his increasingly orthodox calls on the country to 
live within its means rather than spend its way out of trouble, it could well be the case 
that the recession has exposed the limits of Cameron’s much-trumpeted commitment 
to the centre ground.
So, has Cameron really got what it takes?
Given that the Conservative Party has from 1975 onwards chosen its leaders largely 
because of who they are not, it has, ever since, picked the least well-known candidate 
of those on offer.  Labour did the same in 1983, but not in 1992 or in 1994 when it 
picked a politician about whom many members had their doubts but who seemed far 
more likely than his rivals to win it  an election.  When David Cameron won the 
leadership contest in 2005, it was by no means certain whether this simply represented 
a continuation of the Tory trend or a genuine attempt to do what the Party’s only 
serious rival had done.  In some ways, because the circumstances are more propitious 
and because the man they chose has a strategy and a skill-set that is demonstrably 
superior to those of his predecessors, it no longer really matters.  Cameron is not 
without weaknesses or without critics.  Not all of them are things he can do much 
about but some are sufficiently  serious that they might make it more difficult for him 
than it could or should be to win the next general election.  But it  is literally 
impossible to imagine anyone else in the contemporary Conservative Party who 
would have been able to make as much as he has of the hand he was dealt.   
The legendary liberal columnist, and biographer of the last Tory leader to make it 
from opposition into government, Hugo Young, once had a stab at defining what was 
required in a political leader:
A leader needs nerve: chutzpah in defence of risk is a key component.  A leader needs menace: 
the instilling of a certain fear, growing out of the capacity for dangerous surprise. A leader 
needs wit: the ability to make swift repartee for television, never flummoxed, sometimes 
outrageous, usually winning.  A leader needs steel: a quiet intransigence of purpose that 
everybody understands, without always being certain of the inner game he may be playing.12
Cameron would seem to have all of the first  four of what Young termed ‘the essential 
pieces of the leaderly  personality’.  Whether he has the fifth and final component – 
what Young called ‘some kind of vision’ – is not yet quite so apparent, and may not 
become so unless and until he moves into Number Ten.  On the other hand, a putative 
Cameron government will inevitably spend most of its time clearing up the economic 
mess left by Labour.  Likewise, some of the things he has promised to do once in 
power – particularly  with regard to re-jigging this country’s relationship with the EU 
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and reducing the role of targets in the public sector – could prove very time 
consuming and even counterproductive.13  All of this is likely to leave the man who is 
likely to be Britain’s next Conservative Prime Minister less room than he might like to 
pursue big ideas, even assuming that, as a self-confessed Tory pragmatist, he really is 
in the market for them.
Notes
1 On Cameron’s successful leadership bid, see Andrew Denham and Kieron O’Hara 
(2008) Democratising Conservative Leadership Selection.  From Grey Suits to Grass 
Roots (Manchester: Manchester University Press), Chapters 5 and 6.  See also 
Timothy Heppell (2007) Choosing the Tory Leader (London: Tauris).
2 For a more detailed exercise measuring the evidence according to indicators of party 
change derived from comparative political science , see Tim Bale (2008) ‘“A Bit Less 
Bunny-Hugging and a Bit More Bunny-Boiling?” Qualifying Conservative Party 
Change under David Cameron’, British Politics, 3, pp. 270-299.  See also Stephen 
Evans, ‘Consigning its Past to History?  David Cameron and the Conservative Party’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 61 (2), pp. 291-314.
3 Philip Norton ‘The Future of Conservatism’, Political Quarterly, 79 (3), 2008, pp. 
324-332.  See also Stuart Ball, ‘Factors in Opposition Performance: the Conservative 
Experience since 1867’, in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, Recovering Power: the 
Conservatives in Opposition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
4 Matthew Parris, ‘The Force is with David the Unruffled’, Times, 10 December 2005
5 The judgements made here about the balance of power and opinion within the 
Conservative Party both before and after Cameron became leader are based on 
documentary and interview research conducted by the author for a forthcoming book 
on the Party since 1990.  The author would like to acknowledge the financial 
assistance provided by the Leverhulme Trust for that research.  For a more concise 
treatment, see Tim Bale (2009) ‘The Conservatives: Trounced, Transfixed, 
Transformed’ in Terrence Casey (ed) The Blair Legacy (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
6 Figures kindly provided by Philip Cowley.  Note though that some of the majority 
who won their seat in 1997 or after may have sat in the Commons previously.
7 On the Hague years, see Mark Garnett and Philip Lynch, eds. (2003) The 
Conservatives in Crisis (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
8 For how and why it is misguided to label the Conservatives’ focus on Europe and 
immigration a ‘core vote’ strategy, see Jane Green (2005) ‘Conservative party 
rationality: Learning the lessons from the last election for the next’, Journal of 
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 15 (1), pp. 111-127
9 For a transcript of the speech by Peter Lilley which sent his Party so ballistic – and 
sent his leader scurrying for cover, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/1999/apr/
20/conservatives.
10 Malcolm Gladwell (2008) Outliers: The Story of Success (London: Allen Lane).
11 David Cameron, ‘Modern Conservatism’, Demos, 30 January 2006, available 
online at http://www.demos.co.uk/files/davidcameronmodernconservatism.pdf
12 Hugo Young, ‘Duncan Smith is finished.  Voters want a human being’, Guardian, 
31 October, 2002.
13 On the challenges the Conservative Party has, not altogether wisely perhaps, set 
itself in power, see Tim Bale, ‘Passing the Wednesday-Friday Test’, Parliamentary 
Brief, July 15 2008.
